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RAPPORT IN NEGOTIATION AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
JANICE NADLER*
In negotiation, rapport is a powerful determinant of the extent to which
negotiators develop the trust necessary to reach integrative agreements.
Rapport between negotiators is linked to negotiators' willingness to cooperate,
to share crucial information, to make fewer ultimatums and threats, and to a
reduction of the risk of impasse. This essay first outlines the general concept
of rapport and how it develops between people in social interactions. This
essay then focuses on key implications of rapport for negotiations.
I. WHAT IS RAPPORT?
Interpersonal rapport has been described as a state of mutual positivity and
interest. 1  The development of rapport has been characterized by three
dynamic components: (1) mutual attention and involvement; (2) positivity;
and (3) coordination. These will be considered in turn.
First, mutual attention and involvement are exemplified by the simple idea
that my focusing attention on you makes you feel involved in the interaction,
and vice-versa. An important component of rapport is when we both
simultaneously attend to one another and both feel involved in the interaction.
Mutual attention and involvement are signaled by the physical orientation of
participants in the interaction. For example, spontaneous formation of a
circular or semi-circular configuration in a group, forward lean, uncrossed
arms, and eye contact are all signals of attention, and, in turn, foster feelings
of involvement in the interaction.2
Second, rapport is characterized by participants in an interaction having
positive attitudes toward one another. Such mutual positivity is signaled by
particular nonverbal behaviors such as forward lean, eye contact, smiling, and
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1. See Linda Tickle-Degnen & Robert Rosenthal, The Nature of Rapport and Its Nonverbal
Correlates, 1 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 285 (1990); Don A. Moore et al., Long and Short Routes to Success
in Electronically Mediated Negotiations: Group Affiliations and Good Vibrations, 77
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 22, 24 (1999).
2. See Linda Tickle-Degnen & Robert Rosenthal, Group Rapport and Nonverbal Behavior, 9
REV. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 118-19 (1986).
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gestures.3
Third, most definitions of rapport include in their descriptions the feeling
of being "in sync" with the other persons in the interaction. Rapport-related
coordination includes smooth turn taking in conversation, in which the
listener acknowledges understanding, agreement, or attention with forward
lean, head nods, and brief verbal responses (e.g., "uh-huh").4 In addition to
smooth turn taking, rapport-related coordination is characterized by
nonconscious mimicry, which occurs when one person imitates the behaviors
of another.5 Without even realizing it, when people interact they tend to
mirror one another in posture, facial expression, tone of voice, and
mannerisms. On the surface, it might seem that mimicking would be
annoying-almost like a form of mockery. The type of mimicry that is
involved in everyday social encounters, however, is quite subtle-people do
not usually recognize when it is happening. At the same time, powerful
effects of mimicry result in greater liking and rapport in an interaction. For
example, in one study, half the participants were mimicked by the other
person in the interaction and half were not. Participants who were mimicked
rated the interaction as more smooth and harmonious than those who were
not.6 Additionally, when people are motivated to create an affiliation with
another person, they automatically and unconsciously increase their mimickry
behavior to accomplish this goal.7 When two people are mirroring one
another, their movements become a choreographed dance. To the extent that
our behaviors are synchronized with those of others, we feel more rapport,
and this increases our trust in those with whom we communicate. 8 Such
rapport-based trust is particularly useful during negotiation.
II. THE ROLE OF RAPPORT IN NEGOTIATION
Frequently, negotiations involve mixed-motive conflicts in which
negotiators are motivated to cooperate just enough to ensure a settlement is
reached, but at the same time, each negotiator is motivated to compete with
each other to claim the greatest possible bargaining surplus for themselves. 9
In mixed-motive conflicts where the collectively optimal outcome requires
3. Id.
4. Id. at 125.
5. See Jessica L. Lakin & Tanya L. Chartrand, Using Nonconscious Behavioral Mimicry to
Create Affiliation and Rapport, 14 PSYCH. Sci. 334 (2003).
6. Tanya L. Chartrand & John A. Bargh, The Chameleon Effect: The Perception-Behavior Link
and Social Interaction, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 893, 900-03 (1999).
7. See Lakin & Chartrand, supra note 5, at 334.
8. Id.
9. See LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 36-37 (2d ed. 2001).
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cooperation, it is often the case that each party would prefer to cooperate if
the other party does, but not otherwise. To reach a collectively optimal
outcome in such situations, parties must coordinate on cooperation.10
There is now considerable empirical evidence suggesting that the
development of rapport fosters cooperative behavior necessary for efficient
negotiated outcomes in mixed-motive conflicts. Some of this evidence
derives from experimental investigations in which bargainers communicate in
intentionally impoverished environments (e.g., side by side, intercom,
telephone, email) in order to systematically examine the extent to which
stifling rapport development hinders efficient conflict resolution. Other
studies examining various aspects of bargainers' social relationships (e.g.,
social affiliation, affect, identification with an ingroup) produce evidence
consistent with the possibility that rapport facilitates conflict resolution by
encouraging cooperative behavior. In this section, I will review briefly both
literatures.
A. Visual Access and Rapport in Conflict Resolution
Because important components of rapport are linked with nonverbal
expression and because most channels of nonverbal expression are accessible
only visually," we would expect that the efficacy of conflict resolution would
be reduced by limited visual access. For example, mutual attention and
involvement requires that I know that you are attending to me and vice versa;
in the absence of visual cues this can be difficult. Similarly, most forms of
mimicry require visual access.
How does lack of visual access affect rapport and cooperation in conflict
resolution? Several studies show that visual access enhances cooperation
among players in a Prisoner's Dilemma and other social dilemmas. For
example, in one game, players are asked to make a decision on behalf of a
small company regarding the advertising of a product sold by only one other
small company. The task is structured as a Prisoner's Dilemma, and the
decision to cooperate or compete is made by the two parties simultaneously
and separately. Cooperation by both parties yields the highest collective
outcome; however, individual incentives favor competition regardless of the
other party's decision. In a study where participants played the advertising
game seven times, there was one condition in which players were not
permitted to communicate prior to making their decision; in the second
10. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 60 (1960).
II. Aimee L. Drolet & Michael W. Morris, Rapport in Conflict Resolution: Accounting for
How Face-to-Face Contact Fosters Mutual Cooperation in Mixed-Motive Conflicts, 36 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 26 (2000).
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condition, players were permitted a brief face-to-face meeting prior to each
round; in the third condition, players did not communicate, but instead
envisioned a meeting with the opponent prior to each round and recorded in a
journal what they would say to each other.' 2 Results indicate that during the
first six rounds, no communication resulted in the lowest rates of cooperation,
and the face-to-face meeting resulted in the highest. Interestingly, imagining
the face-to-face meeting boosted the cooperation rate above that of the no
communication group, although not as high as the actual face-to-face group."
In another study using the same advertising Prisoner's Dilemma game,
participants engaged in a brief introductory conversation prior to playing the
game.' 4 The conversation took place either face-to-face or via speakerphone.
After the conversation, subjects rated the extent to which they felt rapport
during the conversation. In addition, independent coders later viewed
videotapes of the conversation and rated the extent to which the participants
displayed mutual interest and gestural synchrony. Both the coders and the
participants themselves reported higher rapport when the conversation took
place face-to-face compared to speakerphone. Higher rapport in the face-to-
face condition proved to be a crucial element in the decision to cooperate in
the advertising game that followed: participants who had met face-to-face
were significantly more likely to cooperate in the advertising conflict than
were participants who talked via speakerphone. Most important, rapport
ratings (both subjective and objective) mediated the relationship between
visual access and cooperation: i.e., visual access led to higher rapport, which
in turn led to more cooperation in the advertising conflict.
The studies just discussed demonstrate that visual access prior to decision
making in a Prisoner's Dilemma game improves rapport, which encourages
cooperation, leading to better collective outcomes. Other work shows that
visual access during the course of a negotiation also improves collective
outcomes. For example, in a simulated strike negotiation in which settling the
strike quickly was mutually beneficial, union and management representatives
exchanged written offers while sitting either side by side (without visual
access to the other party's nonverbal behavior) or sitting face-to-face.
Negotiators sitting side by side endured longer strikes and as a result less
beneficial outcomes than negotiators sitting face-to-face. The side-by-side
negotiators did not have the benefit of visual cues and were less able to
12. David Sally, A General Theory of Sympathy, Mind-Reading, and Social Interaction, with an
Application to the Prisoners'Dilemma, 39 THEORY & METHODS 567, 616 (2000).
13. During the last round, the face-to-face group cooperated more than the other two groups;
there was no difference between the no communication and imagined communication group.
14. Drolet & Morris, supra note 11, at98 n.13.
[87:875
RAPPORT
engage in mutual attention and mimickry that are the building blocks of
rapport, suggesting that the experience of rapport among the face-to-face
negotiators facilitated coordination.
5
B. Relationships and Cooperation in Conflict Resolution
Apart from visual access, cooperative behavior is also facilitated by the
perceived affiliation of the participants in a conflict or negotiation. In general,
people often use noticed similarities between themselves and the other person
as a basis for categorizing the other as an ingroup member.16 Once we decide
that we share an affiliation with another person, many consequences follow:
we evaluate members of our own group more favorably; we allocate more
rewards to members of our own group; and we are more cooperative when
dealing with ingroup members.17 The special treatment of and affinity for
ingroup members can arise from even the most superficial basis (e.g., we both
like the same artist). Even the mere act of communication leads to feelings of
affiliation that promotes cooperation in a social dilemma. In these
circumstances cooperation arises from not simply the formation of
commitments (i.e., "I promise to cooperate if you do"), but rather from
emotional social aspect of communication (e.g., "I like you because we are
alike, so I will cooperate with you"). 18 Feelings of liking toward another
person can lead to an increase in perception of similarity and convergence of
attitudes, 19 and similarity in attitudes can, in turn, lead to more cooperation.
20
The greater likelihood of cooperation stemming from the perception of an
affiliation or a prior relationship has been confirmed in the context of legal
settlement negotiations. In a study of actual legal disputes, Johnston and
Waldfogel examined whether the existence of a prior relationship between
opposing counsel would affect the likelihood of settlement in civil lawsuits.2'
After examining thousands of cases, they found that cases were resolved more
quickly and were less likely to go to trial when opposing counsel had faced
each other in the past, than when the attorneys did not know each other.
Johnston and Waldfogel argue that when attorneys have repeated interactions,
they learn how to communicate in a way that promotes the cooperative
15. Id.
16. See Moore et al., supra note 1, at 25.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 40 (citing Norbert L. Kerr et al., That Still, Small Voice: Commitment to Cooperate as
an Internalized Versus Social Norm, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1300 (1997)).
19. Sally, supra note 12, at 590.
20. Id. at 609.
21. Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? Evidence
From Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2002).
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sharing of crucial information. The elimination of information asymmetries
allows attorneys who know each other to converge on a settlement that is
perceived as acceptable to both sides. But why would attorneys be more
willing to share private information simply because they have faced their
opponent in the past? This question is especially puzzling in light of the
adversarial context of the interactions of litigation counsel.
A laboratory study of group affiliation among negotiators provides
insight.22 In this study, business students negotiated either with students from
their own school or students from a different school. Consistent with
Johnston and Waldfogel's theory, those who negotiated with an ingroup
member revealed more about their own preferences, asked more information-
seeking questions, and in the end, were more likely to achieve a negotiated
agreement compared to those who negotiated with an outgroup member.23
However, a key finding uncovered in the laboratory study is that affiliation
produces rapport, which in turn, reduces the likelihood of impasse.24 Thus, in
the absence of a basis for a positive relationship, such as shared group
affiliation, negotiators do not express much positive affect, do not develop as
25
much rapport, and are less likely to come to an agreement.
III. DEVELOPING RAPPORT WHEN VISUAL ACCESS AND RELATIONSHIPS ARE
LIMITED
In the absence of visual access or a basis for a positive relationship,
negotiators are less likely to develop the kind of rapport that promotes
cooperation necessary to reach efficient agreements in mixed-motive
negotiations. Can negotiators working under these circumstances take steps
to develop rapport on their own initiative? Even though rapport normally
develops in social interactions without social actors even being aware of it,
several studies have identified methods that can be used by negotiators who
wish to develop rapport to enhance negotiation processes and outcomes.
Sometimes we must negotiate with people we do not know and have never
met. Moreover, the advent of communication technologies, like email, means
that sometimes the negotiation itself does not provide the opportunity for a
face-to-face meeting with our counterpart. Negotiating with someone with
whom we have no prior relationship, and using a communication medium that
provides no visual access (e.g., telephone, email), makes it more likely that
22. Moore et al., supra note 1, at 27-38.
23. Id. at 35.
24. Id. at 39.
25. Affect-based rapport is measured by negotiators' feelings of anger, disappointment,
frustrations, as well as friendliness, positivity, and warmth, among other things. Id. at 3 1.
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rapport will not sufficiently develop, that cooperative information exchange
will be insufficient, and that the result will be an impasse rather than a
mutually beneficial agreement. How can this undesirable state of affairs be
avoided in a world in which negotiation with strangers using information
technology is taken as a given?
First, negotiators who make an effort to create a basis for a positive
relationship by engaging in a short, get-acquainted conversation create a basis
for smooth negotiation processes that follow. For example, in two studies,26
some negotiators who used e-mail to negotiate a transaction with a stranger
were instructed to talk on the telephone and schmooze for ten minutes in an
effort to get to know one another. Other negotiators were not given this
opportunity. Engaging in small talk enabled negotiators who were strangers
to affiliate in a fashion that did not spontaneously occur during the process of
e-mail exchange. The seemingly inert act of schmoozing facilitated
cooperation during the negotiation, leading to the sharing of crucial
information with the other part, and resulting in favorable impressions of the
counterpart after the negotiation.
By contrast, negotiators who did not chat with their counterpart prior to
negotiation either failed to exchange the kind of information that would lead
to identification of mutually beneficial solutions, or failed to recognize as
beneficial the solutions which arose, leading to a greater likelihood of
impasse. In the absence of the preliminary chat, the two negotiation
counterparts were complete strangers, never having seen one another or heard
one another's voice, hindering the development of rapport. By failing to
reach agreement, pairs that reached an impasse settled for a result that was
economically worse than any of the many possible agreements that would
have resulted in a profitable outcome for each party. The prenegotiation,
getting-to-know-you chat allowed the negotiation to proceed more smoothly
by creating rapport before the negotiation began. This rapport helped
negotiators approach the negotiation with a more cooperative mental model,
thereby trusting in each others' good intentions. This mental model, in turn,
led to a successful negotiation that concluded with a contract and engendered
positive feelings about one another. Adopting an attitude that was more
cooperative than competitive allowed negotiators to trust the other party
enough to share with them relevant private information, and to expect the
other party to reciprocate by sharing their own relevant private information,
which, in turn, resulted in identification of and agreement to efficient
26. See Michael Morris et al., Schmooze or Lose: Social Friction and Lubrication in E-mail
Negotiations, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 89, 90-95 (2002); Janice Nadler, Rapport in Legal Negotiation:
How Small Talk Can Facilitate E-mail Dealmaking, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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solutions.
If preliminary small talk is not possible, there are other means for creating
the basis for a rapport-promoting positive relationship. For example, in the
Moore et al. study discussed earlier,27 negotiators who were students at the
same school (but did not necessarily know one another) were more successful
at generating rapport than students at different schools. As a result, their
impasse rate was lower (especially when their email exchanges contained
mutual self disclosures). In addition, other negotiators who exchanged
pictures and personal biographical information (such as alma mater, interests,
hobbies) generated more affect-based rapport. The absence of either of these
factors (ingroup identification or mutual self-disclosure) led to a much higher
impasse rate than when negotiators had a basis for a positive relationship.
Thus, prior to negotiation, strangers who negotiate can try to create a basis for
affiliation, through identification of shared interests, group memberships, and
so forth. This shared affiliation will then create the basis for affect-based
rapport that leads to cooperation, information exchange, and mutually
beneficial agreements.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a face-to-face negotiation, nonverbal (e.g., body orientation, gestures,
eye contact, head nodding) and paraverbal (e.g., the use of "uh-huhs")
behaviors are important building blocks of rapport. Face-to-face contact
contributes to smooth negotiations because, although seldom consciously
recognized, people rely heavily on nonverbal signals and mimicry to help
them conduct social interactions. In face-to-face negotiation, rapport tends to
develop quite naturally, resulting in the feeling of being "in sync" or "on the
same wavelength" with another person. In negotiation, the rapport that results
from visual access facilitates cooperation and mutually beneficial negotiation
outcomes.
In the absence of face-to-face communication, negotiators can rely upon
noticed similarities between themselves and their counterpart as a basis for
generating affect-based rapport to facilitate a smooth negotiation process. In
the absence of either visual access or a positive relationship, negotiators can
create rapport synthetically by means of a prenegotiation, a getting-to-know-
you-chat, or a mutual self-disclosure. These simple steps are likely to
facilitate conflict resolution in mixed-motive negotiations.
27. See Moore et al., supra note 1, at 27-38.
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